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INTRODUCTION

Amanda Knox is home. For almost two years now, Knox has woke up each day in
the United States. She has resumed her studies at the University of Washington in Seattle.
Knox has been able to see her family and friends; she has been able to live freely. Over
the past four years, Knox has endured an existence devoid of liberty. How Knox returned
to the United States is a complicated story, but explaining how she wants to live each day
going forward is quite simple: she wants to have a choice in the matter.
On November 2, 2007, Meredith Kercher, a British study abroad student, was
found on the floor of her bedroom, lying lifelessly in a pool of her own blood. Police
arrived promptly at the scene of the crime, and, then, just as quickly, targeted Amanda
Knox, a twenty-year-old American study abroad student who shared a flat with the victim
and two other young women, as a suspect. In 2009, Knox was tried for the murder of
Kercher before a jury in the Court of Assize of Perugia. On December 4, 2009, the jury
convicted Knox on all charges. Knox's attorneys then filed an appeal in the Assize Court
of Appeal. In 2011, the Assize Court of Appeal ruled on the merits of the case, reversed
the decision of the lower court, and entered an order of acquittal on all charges. After
Knox was acquitted, she was immediately released from prison, and she returned home to
the United States.
Thousands of miles of separation from Knox did not, however, prevent the public
prosecutor in Italy from filing an appeal in Italy's Supreme Court, the Corte di Cassation,
opposing the Assize Court of Appeal's judgment of acquittal. On March 26, 2013, the
Italian Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Assize Court of Appeal and entered

an order remanding the matter for the retrial of Knox and her former boyfriend Rafaele
Sollecito on the same offenses comprising the original indictment. The retrial of this
matter commenced on September 30, 2013. A verdict is expected in early January 2014.
If Amanda Knox is ultimately convicted, and Italy requests extradition, the United States
government will face novel circumstances giving rise to rather delicate issue: when our
bilateral extradition treaty with Italy is pitted against Amanda Knox's fundamental
constitutional rights, what is the proper course of action?
In the event that the Italian court decides to convict Knox (in abstentia, as she is
currently in Seattle) this Note argues that we should not extradite her to Italy. Part I of
this Note sets forth a highly abridged version of the written decisions of the Italian courts
in this matter, totaling in excess of one thousand pages. Factual discussion will be limited
to the extent necessary to enable the reader to gain an appreciation for the novel
circumstances that Knox's case presents, and also to understand the extent to which
Italy's course of performance in the Knox case is at odds with the rights American
citizens deem essential to the concept of ordered liberty.
Part II of this Note takes the position that if Italy requests the extradition of Knox,
the fundamental rights that the United States Constitution affords to its citizens compel
one, and only one, result: a non-negotiable denial of the request through the proper
diplomatic channels. The 1984 United States-Italy Bilateral Extradition Treaty
irreconcilably conflicts in this case with the ban the Fifth Amendment places on
successive prosecutions for the same offense. Secondly, basic legal maxims in both Italy
and Europe as a whole provide further support a decision to not extradite in this situation.
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Part III of this Note then sets forth a proposal about how to most effectively
address the potential fallout that could result from the United State's failure to comply
with its treaty obligations with Italy. The author contends the Knox case presents a
compelling opportunity to attempt to negotiate a modification to the parties' certain
treaty. This Note predicts that Italy would be amenable to hearing such a proposal at the
very least for reasons that will be discussed herein.
Part IV of this Note centers on the nightmare trial of Amanda Knox, subsequent
acquittal by Italy's appellate court, and ultimate order to retry Knox for the same offense.
This Note argues that the trial of Amanda Knox comprehensively, and convincingly,
demonstrates the pressing need to implement the above-discussed changes in the areas of
criminal constitutional modeling, treaty negotiation, and transnational constitution
protection of criminal rights. If Knox is convicted after retrial, Italy will request that the
United States extradite Knox. This Note concludes that the United States must deny the
extradition request in order to facilitate the changes previously discussed, and which will
be explained in further detail below. The United States' continued practice of forcing
Knox, and countless others, to forfeit their fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed
under the United States constitution as soon as they set foot outside United States borders
is inimical to the American concept of ordered liberty. Further, this practice is growing
increasingly anachronistic in light of modem developments in transnational constitutional
practices in the context of criminal justice, and, therefore, must be discarded in order to
preserve the stability of rule of law, and, most importantly, to protect the legitimacy of
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the United States Constitution and, in tum, its ability to serve as a constitutional model
that other countries can emulate or look to for guidance.

I. BACKGROUND
In 2007, Amanda Knox, a twenty-year-old American undergraduate student at the
University of Washington, arrived in the idyllic hillside town of Perugia, Italy. Knox
hoped to "expand her horizons" and learn how to live "without a safety net" while
studying abroad for a year. 1 Right after she set foot on Italian soil, Knox stumbled upon a
room for rent in a cottage at 7 Via della Pergola. Wrapped up in the moment and feeling
thrilled that she found and subleased a "cute house" all on her own, Knox failed to notice
the backdrop of undulating mountains, obstructed sky, and cypress trees. 2 Knox would
forever remember 7 Via della Pergola for its famous view, one that invited the promise of
infinite possibility.
Fast forward to December 5, 2009. Amanda Knox still had a view of a cypress
tree, but only one; she was able to see it through the bars of a stnall window in her prison
cell-her only view to the outside world. 3 December 5, 2009 was Knox's second day at
her new home-in Capanne prison. A court found Knox guilty of murder and sentenced
her to twenty-six years in prison. 7 Via della Pergola is no longer Knox's oasis; rather, it
is a heart-wrenching reminder of the place where her friend, Kercher, was brutally
murdered. It is the place where, according to an eight-person jury, Knox slashed
1

Nathaniel Rich, The Neverending Nightmare of Amanda Knox, ROLLING STONE (June 27, 20 II),
http://www .rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-neverending-nightmare-of-amanda-knox-20 II 0627.
2/d.
3 /d.
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Kercher's throat and left her there to die. 4 The cottage was where Knox's nightmare
began; today, more than five years have passed since police opened what amounted to a
severely flawed investigation. Feeling the pressure of the worldwide captive audience
tracking every development in this case, the police and public prosecutor set out to hold
someone (really, anyone) accountable for Kercher's death, and, judging from the
management of the investigation and the subsequent (and still ongoing) adjudication of
this matter, they were. willing to obtain a guilty verdict, no 1natter what the cost. 5 The
police and public prosecutor trampled on several constitutionally guaranteed rights,
overtly failed to preserve the crime scene from the outset, cross-contaminated DNA
evidence, and developed a theory of the case that was so bombastic and out of touch with
the evidence (or, more appropriately, lack thereof) that the trial of this matter has reeked
of bad faith every step of the way. 6 Knox's fate still hangs in the balance of what this
author contends can fairly be described as a "kangaroo court."
Kercher lived at 7 Via della Pergola with three other women: Knox, and two
Italian natives, Laura Mezzetti and Filomena Romanelli. 7 Kercher's bedroom was located
on one end of the apartment, and Knox occupied the bedroom in the middle of the
apartment. 8 Kercher and Knox shared a bathroom, which was located close to Kercher's

4/d.
s Jd.
6/d.
7
Sentenza della Corte d'Ass., 4 Marzo 2010, n. 7/2009, I, at 24 (It.), available at
http://www.perugiamurderfile.org/download/file.php? id= 1902&sid=a 1344c3d364ff8cc7fdce0344d2abd30.
The sentencing court issued a four-hundred-twenty-seven-page opinion recounting a summary of all the
evidence presented and the jury's process in deliberating./d.
8
/d. at 24--25.
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room. 9 All of the occupants of the building were interviewed by the investigative police.
The investigative police learned from Knox that she had returned to her apartment the
morning of November 2, to shower and change her clothes. 10 She had spent the previous
evening at the apartment of her new boyfriend, Raffaele Sollecito. 11 Romanelli told the
police that Knox had called her earlier that same morning to report that there might be
something wrong at their apartment because the front door was open and no one appeared
to be home. 12 Knox entered the apartment and went to the bathroom to have a shower,
and noticed that there were traces of blood in the bathroom. 13 She also noticed that in
Romanelli's room the windowpane was broken and the room had been left in .a state of
disarray. 14 Finally, she noticed that Kercher's room was locked. 15
Knox and Sollecito called the police to report a break-in at the cottage at 7 Via
della Pergola. Police arrived, broke down the locked door to Kercher's room, and found
her, "under a blood-soaked duvet cover ... with her throat slashed," lying lifelessly in a
pool of her own blood on her bedroom floor in Perugia, Italy. 16 Six people, in addition to
two policemen, were present in the apartment at the time Kercher's body was
discovered. 17 The police ordered everyone out of the house and no one was allowed to

9

/d. at 24.
/d. at 35
II /d.
12
/d. at 29-30.
13
/d. at 30.
10

14/d.
15/d.
16
Ian Fisher, Grisly Murder Case Intrigues Italian University City, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2007},
http://www .nytimes.com/2007/11/ 13/world/europe/13perugia.html.
17
Sentenza della Corte d'Ass., 4 Marzo 2010, n. 7/2009, at 25 (It.), available at
http://www.perugiamurderfile.org/download/file.php? id= 1902&sid=a 1344c3d364ff8cc7fdce0344d2abd30.
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enter the bedroom} 8 Shortly after the grizzly discovery, the investigative unit of the
Perugia police arrived. Kercher's body was removed from the apartment and her
bedroom was secured until the scientific police had completed their investigation. After
examining the body, the coroner estimated the time of death somewhere between 10:00
p.m. on November 1 and 4:30 a.m. on November 2, 2007. The cause of death was
strangulation due to the crushing of the hyoid bone and the slitting of the throat area with
a knife. The wound on the left side of the neck was very deep and wide, indicating a cut
with a large, sharp knife. However, the wound on the right side of the neck was much
smaller, indicating the width of the blade to have been about three centimeters. The
victim also suffered sexual violence, indicative of non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Cell phones had been found near the scene of the crime, one of which belonged to
Filomena Romanelli, and the police had traced a call made to one of the cell phones to
Amanda Knox's phone. 19 Romanelli identified the two found cell phones as belonging to
Kercher. 20 The police learned from Kercher's other girlfriends that they had eaten dinner
with Kercher at her apartment on November 1, and they left at about 9 p.m. 21 They also
said that Kercher had been seeing one of the boys living downstairs named Giacomo
Silenzi. 22 Silzenzi admitted to having a romantic relationship with Kercher; but he also
told the police that Rudy Guede, someone he had played basketball with near the house,
had expressed interest in Knox and had previously come over to the girls' apartment. 23

18
19

20
21
22
23

/d. at 32-33.
/d. at 26.

/d.
/d. at 36.
/d. at 38.
/d. at 39, 42.
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Guede was not originally a suspect. However, upon learning that he was interested in
Knox, the police named him as a suspect and then searched his apartment.

24

The police

obtained Guede's DNA from his apartment on November 20?5 The DNA found in
Kercher's vagina, on her bra strap, the cuff of her sweatshirt, and on her purse was then
matched to his DNA. 26 Further biological traces of Guede were located on the toilet paper
in the front bathroom of the girls' apartment. 27 The bloodstained footprints coming from
Kercher's room were later connected to a pair of Guede's shoes that were also found in
his apartment. It should be noted that Sollecito also wore the same type and size shoes
and the footprints were at an earlier time attributed to him. 28 By the time of the trial, the
prosecutor presumed that Guede was the perpetrator of the murder. However, the
prosecutor reasoned that Guede had assistance from Knox and Sollecito because there
was very little evidence that Kercher had struggled. 29
Other non-DNA evidence also implicated Rudy Guede. Four days prior to the
murder, on October 27, 2007, Guede was charged with breaking and entering into a
nursery school in Milan in which he stole a jack-knife and money. 30 This knife matched
the type of knife used to cut Kercher's throat. Guede had also broken into a law office
some days prior into by throwing a rock through the window in the same way that
Kercher's apartment was broken into. 31 Two other knives were also attributed to the

24

Id.
ld.
26
Id.
27
ld.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
ld.
31
Jd.
25

at 39-40.
at 195.
at 195.
at 43-44.
at 333-34.
at 45.
at 47.
at 45.
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crime. One was a knife found in Sollecito' s kitchen and the other was a knife found in the
girls' kitchen. However, the coroner was unable to determine which of the three knifes
was the actual murder weapon. 32
From November 2, 2007 to November 6, 2007, police subjected Knox to fortythree hours of coercive interrogation, with the final eight hours conducted overnight
without food or water. 33 Knox finally broke and signed a document that accused Diya
"Patrick" Lumumba (who owned a pub where Knox sometimes worked) of murdering
Kercher. Knox later recanted this statement, and Lumumba provided the police with an
alibi that they were able to corroborate. On November 20, 2007, the police released
Lumumba from custody.
According to the testimony of both Knox and Sollecito, they spent the entire
evening of November 1 at his apartment having dinner, watching movies, and smoking
marijuana. 34 Knox testified that when she took a shower in her bathroom she noticed
some blood on the sink and a drop or two on the bathmat. She assumed that the blood
was from one of the roommates. After her shower Knox dressed in her own bedroom and
blow-dried her hair in the front bathroom. At that time she noticed that someone had
failed to flush the toilet. 35
Further police investigation of the neighborhood revealed additional information
that was used at trial. A nearby neighbor heard a loud, long scream from a woman

32

/d. at 172.
Scott 0. Lilienfeld & Robert Byron, Your Brain on Trial: Lessons from Psychology Could Greatly
Improve Courtroom Decision Making, Reducing Racial Bias, Eyewitness Errors and False Confessions,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND (Jan./Feb. 20 13), at 51.
34
/d. at 65.
Js /d. at 65.
33
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coming from Kercher's apartment at approximately 11:30 p.m. on November 1. She also
heard someone running down the metal stairway and along the path. 36 Another witness
confirmed that she too heard running steps on the pathway at about the same time.
However, she was unsure whether there could have been more than one person running. 37
A homeless drug addict named Antonio Curatolo testified that he saw Knox and Sollecito
near the murder scene on November 1, 2007-he thought that he remembered seeing
Knox and Sollecito in a square located between Knox's and Sollecito's apartments
between 9:30 and 11:30 p.m. on the evening prior to the murder. 38
After several lengthy police interrogations, both Knox and Sollecito had
inconsistencies in their testimonies. For example, Sollecito claimed that Knox was not
with him the whole evening. Knox also reported visions that implicated her boss, Patrick
Diya Lumumba in the murder. Sollecito's computer indicated that he was not asleep in
the morning as he stated because music was being playing from his computer. In
addition, the computer records also indicated that the computer had been turned off
between the hours of 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. Knox was further implicated as an accomplice
because she removed the mop from her apartment and had allegedly purchased bleach in
the morning of November 2. There were also other reasons both Knox and Sollecito were
implicated in assisting Guede with murdering Kercher (i.e., an eyewitness account
placing them near the scene of the crime at the time of the crime and a presumed motive
of a possible sex orgy).

36

/d. at 96.
/d. at 97.
JH /d. at 78-79.

37
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II. ANALYSIS
If Amanda Knox is convicted at retrial, Italy will request through the appropriate
diplomatic channels specified in the Bilateral Extradition Treaty that the United States
extradite her to Italy to serve her sentence of incarceration. 39 For the reasons that follow,
the United States should deny the request.
First, and most importantly, an extradition request given the particular facts and
circumstances of this case runs impermissibly afoul of the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains a
number of provisions, including the guarantee that no person "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."40 This is known as the prohibition
against double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause contains three distinct guarantees;
however, in the case of Knox, only one of these iterations is relevant for purposes of
analysis. Specifically, the Double Jeopardy Clause places a ban on subsequent
prosecution after an acquittal for the same offense. 41
In Italy, there is no double jeopardy provision that operates on a national level so
as to be properly considered as a direct analogue to the manner in which the United States
has interpreted its double jeopardy provisions. However, Italy approves of the use of the
maxim non bis in idem, which, in the international realm, provides a defendant with at
least some level of double jeopardy protection insofar as it places a prohibition against

39

Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United State of America and the Government of the
Republic of Italy, U.S.-lt., art. X, Oct. 13, 1983, 1983 U.S.T. 421.
40
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 2.
41
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
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multiple prosecutions for the same offense. 42 In fact, an example of Italy's endorsement
of the non his in idem principle is embodied in the bilateral extradition treaty that is
operative between Italy and the United States. 43
The philosophical underpinning of non his in idem is to ensure that a defendant is
not tried for the same offense by country A and then again by country B. Distilling this
principle further, non his in idem rests on a simple belief: a defendant should not be tried
for the same offense twice. Italy's clear endorsement in the international realm of the
longstanding common-law principle of non his in idem as a fundamental safeguard
intended to protect a defendant against being tried twice for the same offense is not
limited in its application to the provisions of its Bilateral Extradition Treaty with the
United States. Italy has also approved of provisions including the maxim of non bis in

idem in other treaties. Most notably, Italy is a signatory to the European Court of Human
Rights. 44 After drafting its original treaty for the convention, the European Court of
Human Rights penned one of several amendments ("optional protocols") to the original
multilateral treaty; Protocol No. 7 explicitly provides for a prohibition on double

jeopardy. 45 Italy not only signed off on the protocol without issue, but also ratified the
protocol in a prompt fashion thereafter. 46

42

Dax Eric Lopez, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Used to Circumvent Non
Bis in Idem, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1263 (2000).
43
Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Italy, U.S.-lt., art. VI, Oct. 13, 1983, 1983 U.S.T. 421. Article VI of the Extradition Treaty
states the following: "Non Bis in Idem: Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been
convicted, acquitted or pardoned, or has served the sentence imposed, by the Requested Party for the same
acts for which extradition is requested."
44
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Member States-Italy, available at http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/italy.
45
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4,
Nov. 22, 1984, CETS No. 117, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HtmV117.htm
(emphasis added). Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 reads as follows: "Article 4 - Right not to be tried or
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The fact that Italy has retained the common-law notion of non his in idem, as a
practical and necessary safeguard in the context of international adjudication as it relates
to the protection ofdefendants in its dealings with the United States, and has also ratified,
without issue, Protocol No. 7 to the multilateral treaty drafted by the European Court of
Human Rights, which explicitly establishes the positive right that defendants are not to be
tried or punished twice upon acquittal, only serves to bolster the United States' position
that extradition of Knox is inappropriate. Italy plainly sees a considerable degree of merit
in both the maxim of non his in idem and the doctrine of double jeopardy as defined by
Protocol No. 7, which reads almost identically to the American version of double
jeopardy. Other factors, such as the explicit language of the bilateral treaty itself,
strengthens the idea that protection against double jeopardy is an integral part of a
constitutional society, and is fundamental to the liberty interests of the people. 47

punished twice: No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State."
46 /d.
47
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss matters pertaining solely to principles of construction and
interpretation of treaties, but it is worth noting that the explicit text of the Bilateral Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Italy is also is favorable to the position that the United States would not be
required to extradite Amanda Knox. For example, Article I of the treaty between the United States and Italy
reads as follows:
ARTICLE !-Obligation to Extradite
The Contracting Parties agree to extradite to each other, pursuant to the provisions of this
Treaty, persons whom the authorities of the Requesting Party have charged with or found
guilty of an extraditable offense.
A strict reading of the treaty would permit the conclusion that the United States has no basis to extradite
pursuant to the express language of the treaty alone. Since Article II makes clear that the question as to
whether a given offense is extraditable is to be determined under "the laws of both Contracting Parties,"
and the treaty makes no distinction between substantive criminal law and procedural criminal law,
following the standard rule of broad treaty construction and interpretation, it is undoubtedly the case that
the retrial of Knox in Italy following her acquittal was a violation of her double jeopardy rights under
United States law. Again, since the treaty does not distinguish between substantive and procedure law when
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Aside from the above-discussed maxim and the constitutionally protected ban on
double jeopardy, there are limited, but still persuasive, United States based case law
where the judges plainly contemplate the fact that the foundation of our laws is unique to
us, and uniquely valuable. More specifically, our government should at least attempt to
value and vindicate its citizens' fundamental rights guaranteed by its Constitution; the
story of Amanda Knox underscores the importance of the government to reevaluate the
ambit of constitutional liberty as applied to its citizens. For example, in Reid v. Covert, 48
the United States Supreme Court discussed the propriety of the suggestion that "only
those constitutional rights which are 'fundamental' protect Americans abroad. "49 The
Court answered this question in the negative; the Reid court encouraged the government
to utilize fairly expansive discretion to act outside of the continental United States to
protect fundamental rights of its citizens. 50 The Court went on further to profess that the
"concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary
government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates
otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the
benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our govemment." 51 In

considering whether a given offense is extraditable, and it offends common sense to divorce substance from
procedure in the context of criminal law to begin with, when the United States considers whether the
offense is extraditable, it will realize that they must answer a question prior to the above-referenced
question. More specifically, the United States must query, "is there an offense to be considered for
purposes of extradition to begin with?" Since a request for extradition following a retrial after an acquittal
plainly runs afoul of the ban on double jeopardy (again, a procedural rule in criminal law), then this
necessary means that there is no offense to be considered at all. Simply put, the United States can choose
to see the "offense" committed by Amanda Knox to be non-extraditable, since in the United States double
jeopardy would protect her, and she would not be said to have committed an "offense."
48
354 !L..S... I (1957).
49
Covert, 354 U.S. at 9.
sold.
51
Jd. at 14.
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Gallina v. Fraser, 52 a case more factually apposite to the Knox matter, as the case
involved an appeal from an extradition decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit expressed, in dicta, consternation over a hypothetical situation in
which a person was headed to be extradited from the United States and, upon extradition,
would "be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense
of decency as to require reexamination of the principle [that extradition should solely be
handled by the Executive branch in all circumstances]. " 53 If there was ever a case where
the often cited Gallina court would be satisfied that it found its hypothetical defendant's
real world referent, it would be the case of Amanda Knox.

IV. PROPOSAL
Given that the proposal of this Note is that, in the event that the Italian High Court
convicts Knox, the United States should choose to not extradite her, one requirement of
such a proposal is to deal with the fallout from such a decision. Given that the United
States and Italy have an extradition treaty dating back to 1983, Italy will likely see a
failure to extradite as directly contradicting that treaty. Additionally, Italy may view this
action in the same manner that many European countries often view actions taken by the
United States-a mere flexing of American muscle and imperial superiority. To Italy,
Amanda Knox may be an American citizen, but she (allegedly) committed murder on
Italian soil, and, thus, Italy possesses a strong interest in the security and protection of its
citizens, as well as the enforcement of its criminal law. On the other hand, the decision
52

53

278 F .2d 77 ( 1960).
Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79.
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not to extradite Amanda Knox may prove to be quite a favorable one in the international
community outside of Italy. As discussed before, Europe is placing ever-increasing
interest in advancing of a theory of global constitutional criminal law.
The Amanda Knox case presents a compelling opportunity to modify the
extradition treaty between the United States and Italy (and extradition treaties with other
nations as well) to solve a problem that is likely to arise again. As long as other countries
around the world have constitutional principles and criminal justice models that differ
from our own, the United States will continue to be put in situations where it is asked to
extradite individuals to be subjected to criminal prosecutions that we find to be
constitutionally abhorrent.
At first one might think that Italy, as well as most other countries, would not be
amenable to hearing such a proposal. However, the major bargaining chip that the United
States holds in modifying its extradition treaties is that the same principle argued in this
Note could be applied to a reverse situation in which the United States is requesting that a
foreign nation extradite an individual to the United States. Particularly salient with
regards to this matter is the death penalty. Just as the United States Constitution forbids
double jeopardy, and, thus, subjecting Amanda Knox to double jeopardy in Italy is
constitutionally forbidden, the death penalty is constitutionally forbidden in many
European countries, but not the United States. Thus, if we were to amend our extradition
treaties with European nations, allowing modification of terms in connection with the
imposition of the death penalty would permit refusal of extradition in cases in which the
United States is seeking the death penalty. This sort of renewed engagement in treaty
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negotiation, with an eye to more modernized societal norms and values, would likely
benefit diplomatic relations
On a related note, the United States-Italy extradition treaty is outdated. The
United States should offer the opportunity to execute a new, modified, treaty with Italy
that would avoid circumstances like the present case. During the modification process,
this Note suggests that the contracting parties contemplate the vast innovations in
technology that have taken place over the last thirty years. A modified treaty should
incorporate new innovations in technology insofar as such advances more effectively
serve the purposes of the mutual assistance agreement under negotiation. This initiative
will necessitate the United States to make certain concessions, but this Note contends that
new treaty negotiation, when considered in light of modem domestic criminal practices,
as well as the evolving interest in developing a global constitutional criminal law model,
will not only mutually benefit the contracting parties, but will also enhance diplomatic
relations. While the consequences of failing to honor our extradition obligations may
place the United States in a bad light within the international community, this Note
argues it is more likely that refusing to extradite Knox will gamer international support.

V. CONCLUSION
The Amanda Knox case demonstrates that the United States needs to take a
critical look at its extradition treaties with other nations. It is not enough anymore to say
that our Constitution protects American citizens on American soil-for it is just as bad
for the Federal Government to extradite an American citizen to be subject to abhorrent
and unjust criminal procedures in another country, procedures that would violate the
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Constitution if conducted in the United States. While the scope of this Note has focused
solely on double jeopardy, any cursory reading of the plethora of news reports on
Amanda Knox indicates that she was subjected to a whole host of Due Process violations:
unlawful interrogation tactics, including the use of physical force, denial of counsel,
precautionary detention. At one point, Knox's interrogators even lied and told her that
she had contracted the HIV virus in order to get her to list all of her previous sexual
partners. This Note has mentioned that there is a movement towards standardizing
international criminal justice norms, but as long as there are foreign countries that engage
in practices that we find to be objectionable under the U.S. Constitution, these extradition
issues will continue to arise. The United States cannot just blindly extradite its citizens to
be subjected to these procedures anymore. As such, this Note argues that the Amanda
Knox case is the lightning rod necessary to draw attention to the need to modify our
extradition agreements with other countries. Treaties are terminable-our Constitution is
not.
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